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Agency Conflicts, Expropriation and Firm Value: 
Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China 
 
Abstract: 
In this study, we examine the wealth effects of regulatory changes intended to 
improve corporate governance by protecting minority shareholders from expropriation 
by controlling shareholders. Using data from publicly traded Chinese firms, we find 
that these new regulations significantly increased firm value, and that firms with weak 
governance disproportionately benefited relative to firms with strong governance. Our 
evidence provides new support for the theory of La Porta et al. (2002) that better 
investor protection results in higher firm valuations. It also is supportive of the theory 
of Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001) that securities-market regulation can create 
substantial value for minority shareholders in a country with weak judicial 
enforcement.  Finally, it is consistent with Black and Kraakman (1996), who argue 
that, in rule-based civil-law countries, regulation in the form of simple “bright-line 
rules” is more effective than in the form of “broad standards.”   
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent studies of corporate ownership around the world have found that, 
outside of the U.S. and Japan, diffuse ownership is relatively uncommon and most 
corporations are controlled by large block holders.1 Consequently, the primary 
concern of corporate governance has broadened from mitigating the agency conflicts 
between firm managers and diffuse shareholders (Berle and Means (1932); Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)) to protecting minority shareholders from expropriation by a 
controlling block holder and her management team (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).2   
In discussing needed governance reforms, La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that 
countries change the “rules and enforcement mechanisms” for protecting investors 
“towards some successful standard,” a process they refer to as “legal convergence.” 3  
La Porta et al. (2002) support this guidance by demonstrating that firms in countries 
with better investor protection are more valuable than firms in countries with poorer 
investor protection.   
The opposing view, largely based on the work of Coase (1960), maintains that 
legal rules and regulations are not only costly but are largely irrelevant because 
private parties can devise contracts that achieve the same results or because 
government and/or private institutions adapt to protect investors (see, e.g., 
                                                 
1 La Porta et al. (1998) examine ownership of the ten largest firms in 49 countries; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (1999) examine ownership of the twenty largest firms in 27 wealthy countries; 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2002) examine ownership of firms in nine East Asian countries; and 
Faccio and Lang (2002) examine ownership of corporations in thirteen Western European countries. 
2 Johnson et al. (2000) refer to such expropriation as tunneling, which they define as “the transfer of 
resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder (who is typically also a top manager).”  They 
discuss various forms of tunneling, as well as circumstances under which it is legal in some civil-law 
countries.  A number of recent studies, including Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002), Bae, Kang 
and Kim (2002) and Joh (2003) analyze how tunneling affects firm value.  Denis and McConnell 
(2003) provide a recent survey of the literature on international corporate governance. 
3 See La Porta et al. (2000), p.20.  Also, see Coffee (1999) and Gilson (2000) for a discussion of the 
distinction between formal (what La Porta et al. refer to as legal) and functional convergence. 
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Easterbrook and Fishel (1991)). Note that both views emphasize the importance of 
effective enforcement, to ensure laws and regulations to protect outside investors from 
expropriation and contracts between outside investors and controlling shareholders 
can not be broken without recourse.  
In this study, we examine several examples of “legal convergence” in China, 
analyzing how firm values responded to the government’s introduction of four distinct 
regulations aimed at reducing expropriation from minority shareholders. The four 
regulations we examine substantially increased the voting rights of minority 
shareholders at a firm’s Annual Shareholders’ Meeting, prohibited the issuance of 
loan guarantees by a firm to its controlling shareholder, improved the transparency 
and regulation of asset transfers to related parties and required all listed companies to 
include independent directors on their Boards of Directors.4  Our analysis 
demonstrates that introduction of the new regulations designed to better protect 
minority investors significantly  increased shareholder wealth, disproportionately 
benefiting shareholders of firms with weak governance relative to shareholders of 
firms with strong governance.   
Our findings provide new evidence on three important issues raised in the 
“law and finance” literature.  First, we offer new support for the model of La Porta et 
al. (2002, p.1168), which predicts that “poor shareholder protection is penalized with 
lower valuations.”  Second, the positive and significant share-price reactions to 
announcements of the new regulations demonstrate that investors perceived the 
Chinese regulator to be an effective enforcer of rules for protecting minority 
shareholders. This finding provides empirical support, albeit from one market, for the 
                                                 
4  The regulatory changes were partly motivated by China’s successful attempt to gain entrance into the 
World Trade Organization, and reflect the commitment of the Chinese government to improve 
corporate governance.  In a recent report, the World Bank (2002, p. 102) concludes that “corporate 
governance has moved to the center stage of enterprise reform in China,” and (p. 1) that many of the 
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theoretical model of Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001), which predicts that, in 
emerging markets with relatively weak legal systems, regulators can provide an 
effective, and more efficient, substitute for judicial enforcement.  Third, our results 
are consistent with Black and Kraakman (1996), who emphasize the advantages of 
simple “bright-line rules” over “broad standards” in transitional economies with civil-
law judiciaries.5  Our results show significant share price reactions around the 
introduction of three bright-line rules (our first three regulations), but no share-price 
reaction to a new regulation in the broad-standards category (the independent director 
requirement). 
In the remainder of the article, we proceed as follows. Section 2 describes 
some of the salient institutional details of the Chinese share markets, while Section 3 
describes each of the four regulatory changes designed to improve the protection of 
minority shareholders. In Section 4, we describe our data and methodology and 
develop our hypotheses. In Section 5, we present our results, which are followed by a 
summary and conclusions in Section 6. 
 
2. Institutional Details of the Chinese Share Markets 
During the 1990s, the Chinese government privatized more than a thousand 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) through share-issuance privatizations on the two 
primary Chinese stock exchanges--the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). The corporatization and share-issuance 
                                                                                                                                            
recent requirements for listed companies are “even stricter than in Hong Kong and other developed 
markets…and show the authorities’ determination to protect minority shareholders.” 
5 Hay, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) make essentially the same argument about the preference, in 
countries with “imperfect courts,” for bright-line rules over what they call “vague rules.” They point 
out, however, that bright-line rules tend to be “incomplete,” in that they do not spell out every action 
that should be prohibited.   
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privatization of large SOEs are central elements of the Chinese strategy towards 
creation of a “modern-enterprise system.” 6
In China, there are two types of controlling block holders. First, reflective of 
the Chinese “socialist market economy,” the State maintains ultimate control over the 
majority of the nation’s listed firms. The State typically holds its controlling share in 
the form of State shares. The other dominant type of block holder is the holder of 
Legal-Person (“LP”) shares, which are owned by domestic corporations and other 
non-individual legal persons. LPs include listed companies, non-bank financial 
institutions, and State-controlled enterprises that have at least one non-State owner. 
State and LP shares are not publicly traded and cannot be transferred to foreign 
investors, but can be transferred to domestic corporations with the approval by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).  
Individuals and domestic corporations are allowed to hold Tradable-A shares. 
Tradable-A shares are the only type of equity that can be publicly traded among 
domestic investors. In this paper, the market price of a listed company refers to the 
price of Tradable-A shares, and we use the prices of such shares to measure the 
valuation effects of the regulations aimed at improving the protection of minority 
shareholders.7  
Regulators typically require that Tradable-A shares account for more than 
25% of total outstanding shares when a company goes public.  Until July 1999, 
individuals were prohibited to hold more than 0.5% of total shares outstanding for any 
listed company; subsequently, the legal maximum for individual shareholders was 
                                                 
6 Jones et al. (1999) coin the term “share-issuance privatizations.” Sun and Tong (2003) evaluate the 
changes in financial performance of Chinese firms following their share-issuance privatizations. 
7 In addition to domestic shares, some firms have issued foreign shares (B, H and N shares). B-shares 
are available to foreign investors and are traded on the two domestic exchanges, whereas H and N 
shares have an overseas listing. The governance structure for firms with an overseas listing is more 
restrictive, and we exclude firms with H- or N-shares from our later tests (see Xu and Wang, 1999). 
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increased to 5.0%. The legal maximum for individual shareholdings and the absence 
of cumulative voting procedures significantly enhance the control rights of a firm’s 
largest shareholder. The World Bank (2002, p. xiii), concludes that, in China, “. . . 
large shareholders often overstep the bounds of shareholder meetings and boards of 
directors and exercise direct effective control.”  
 
3. Regulations to Improve Minority Shareholder Protection 
Minority-shareholder rights are poorly protected in China. Based on the index 
of investor protection developed by La Porta et al. (1999), MacNeil (2002) calculates 
an index score of two for China as compared with a world average of three, 
suggesting that China falls into the investor-unfriendly category of countries. MacNeil 
also states that, in drafting the Company and Securities Law in China, lawmakers 
were primarily concerned with protecting State control over listed firms. Furthermore, 
courts in China have a long tradition of protecting State interests and have very little 
experience with private plaintiff-driven litigation. Clarke (2003, p. 504) writes “if 
corporate governance reform is understood to mean inserting appropriate private 
rights of action into the Company Law, it is unlikely to lead anywhere very soon.” 
The CSRC is designated as the regulator for securities activities. The CSRC 
has wide-ranging powers in respect of authorization, rule-making, investigation and 
enforcement of all aspects of the securities markets (see Zhu (2000)). The regulatory 
changes that we study were the first substantial improvements in minority-shareholder 
protection implemented by the CSRC, and reflect an increased willingness by the 
Chinese leadership to subordinate State interests to the interests of other shareholders 
(MacNeil (2002) and World Bank (2002)).  Consistent with the argument in Glaeser, 
Shleifer and Johnson (2001), we expect the regulation and enforcement by a 
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specialized and relatively efficient regulator is an effective substitute for judicial 
enforcement.  
Three of the four regulatory changes we study, were announced within a two-
month period during early 2000, and the fourth was announced in June 2001. We 
briefly review each regulation in this section and refer the reader to Appendix I for a 
more detailed description of each. 
The first event is the introduction of a regulation that substantially increased 
the voting rights of minority shareholders at shareholder meetings. Among other 
things, this new regulation: empowered small shareholders to propose motions at a 
firm’s shareholders Annual Meeting; prohibited shareholders involved in associated 
trading from voting at the Annual Meeting on the associated trading; required that 
candidates for directors be voted on individually rather than as a group; and granted 
new legal standing in Chinese courts to shareholders disputing procedures used or 
resolutions passed at a firm’s Annual Meeting. 
The second and third events that we study reduced the ability of controlling 
shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders in more direct manners. The second 
regulation prohibited a listed firm from issuing a loan guarantee to its controlling 
shareholder or related party. The third regulation greatly increased the disclosure 
requirements surrounding asset transfers to related parties, resulting in more 
transparency. 
The fourth new regulation required each listed firm to include independent 
directors on its Boards of Directors and to provide these directors with the resources 
needed to carry out their duties. The regulation also requires independent directors to 
play an active role in oversight of the firm, but does not spell out how they are to 
accomplish this oversight or how their efforts are to be assessed.   
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The following sections examine the effects of the introduction of the four new 
regulations on the value of tradable-A shares in the Chinese share markets.  
 
4. Methodology and Data 
We use standard event-study methodology to analyse the link between 
investor protection and firm value. Our event study enables us to largely avoid the 
potential endogeneity problems inherent in the use of cross-sectional regressions that 
relate investor protection to firm value.8  In our study, the direction of causality 
between shareholder protection and firm value is unambiguous: value changes, if any, 
are the result of the market’s assessment that corporate governance has been 
improved, reducing expected future expropriation of minority shareholders. Another 
advantage of the event study is that it analyzes the change in value for the same 
sample of firms before and after the changes in the regulatory environment. As a 
result, we do not need to control for firm heterogeneity. A disadvantage of our 
approach is that market participants might anticipate the regulatory changes, in which 
case our results provide only a partial estimate of the value changes resulting from 
improving corporate governance.  
 
4.1. Market-Wide Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
To test the overall market impact of the regulations, we form an equally 
weighted portfolio of all 850 sample firms (see below) and analyze the cumulative 
abnormal returns around each of the four events. Our event windows are taken from 
one day before the CSRC release of the new regulation until one day after the 
                                                 
8 For example, firms with high growth potential might improve their corporate governance to obtain 
external financing. Because these firms typically have high levels of Tobin’s Q, a cross-sectional 
regression might erroneously suggest that better corporate governance results in greater firm value. 
Similar problems exist with respect to other measures, such as size and intangible assets (e.g., 
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regulation was first published in the newspaper (Appendix I lists the exact dates for 
each event). We choose this definition of the event period, which results in relatively 
long event windows, based on our observation that share prices react around both the 
initial CSRC release day and the subsequent newspaper announcement. We 
conjecture that the prolonged reaction is the result of the initial release to a limited 
number of market participants including the securities regulatory offices, the stock 
exchanges, and the listed companies. The restricted release makes it likely that many, 
if not most, minority shareholders receive the information only after publication in the 
newspapers.  
We estimate two models to test the market-wide price reaction to the 
regulatory changes. First, we estimate the cumulative mean-adjusted returns around 
each event using the following model: 
 
Market Return t  =  β0   +  Σ β J  Event J  +  ε t ,  J  =  1 to 4    (1) 
 
 
where:  
 
Market Return t is the return for day t on the equally weighted market portfolio 
of firms only listed on the Chinese stock exchanges;  
β0 is the mean portfolio return during the sample period; 
Event J, J = 1 to 4, are dummy variables that equal 1 / n J for the dates within 
the event window of length n J days for the Jth regulation, and 0 otherwise, 
where n1 = 11, n2 = 10, n3 = 23, and n4 = 6;9   
β J, J = 1 to 4, are the estimated cumulative mean-adjusted returns during each 
event window J;  
                                                                                                                                            
Himmelberg et al. 1999), as well as variables measured at the country level (e.g., Klapper and Love 
2003). 
9 We define the dummy variable as equal to 1/n, where n is the length of the event window, so that the 
coefficient on our dummy variable measures the cumulative adjusted return over the entire event 
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ε t is an i.i.d. random-error term for day t. 
Second, as a robustness check intended to control for market-wide price 
movements unrelated to the regulations, we estimate a model that includes the 
contemporaneous return on an equally weighted portfolio of 24 firms from China that 
are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HK Return t). These firms have their 
headquarters and business activities in mainland China, but their shares are only listed 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. We expect that the new regulations are of little 
importance to these firms, as Chinese companies with an overseas listing are subject 
to additional provisions in their articles of association that already substantially 
limited the power of their controlling shareholders.10 The empirical model is:
 
Market Return t =  β0  +  Σ β J   Event J  +  β 5  HK Returnt  +  ε t   (2) 
 
where: 
HK Returnt is the return for day t on the equally weighted portfolio of 24 firms 
from China that are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange; and 
Market Return t, β0, Event J, βJ and ε t are defined as above.
We estimate each model over a period of 500 trading days that ends June 5, 2001—
one day after the newspaper release of the independent director regulation (event 4).11   
 
                                                                                                                                            
window.  Were we to define the dummy variable as equal to 1, then the coefficient would instead 
measure the average daily adjusted return over the event window. 
10 MacNeill (2002, p. 51) argues that the amendments in the articles of overseas listed firms “should be 
viewed as a considerable enhancement of the governance structure by comparison with domestic-only 
listed Chinese companies.”  There are 24 firms from China that are only listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, and 19 Chinese firms that are listed in Hong Kong and also on one of the two Chinese stock 
exchanges. Inclusion of these 19 firms in HK Returnt does not change any of our results. 
11 For the first three events, we use the dates of the release and publication of the actual regulation to 
define the event period. For the independent-director regulation, we use the dates of a speech by the 
CSRC Chairman outlining the new regulation and the public release of the draft regulation to define the 
event period, as all material information was revealed during this period. We also examine the date of 
the actual release of the independent director regulation (August 31, 2001), but this alternative event 
window does not change any of our conclusions. 
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4.2. Cross-Sectional Differences in Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
In addition to testing market-wide changes in value attributable to improved 
shareholder protection, we also test whether the new regulations have a differential 
impact on firms with strong and weak corporate governance. We hypothesize that 
shareholders of firms with weak governance are more reliant upon legal and 
regulatory protection from expropriation by controlling block holders than are 
shareholders of firms with strong governance. Therefore, shareholders of firms with 
weak corporate governance should benefit disproportionately from the new 
regulations.  
We use two different approaches to test the hypothesis that improved 
shareholder protection disproportionately benefits firms with weak governance (high 
levels of expropriation). Our first approach is based on the idea that firms with a high 
level of expropriation by the controlling shareholders are less valuable to minority 
shareholders, resulting in a lower Tobin’s Q. We calculate a firm-specific measure of 
corporate governance, defined as the difference between a firm’s actual and predicted 
Qs, where the predicted value is based on a set of variables commonly used to explain 
Q—firm size, leverage, industrial classification and growth opportunities.12 We refer 
to this measure as Corporate Governance-Q, or CG-Q. We hypothesize that, during 
the event windows, firms with poorer governance (proxied by low CG-Qs) 
outperform firms with better governance (proxied by high CG-Qs).13   
While our first approach is based upon the market’s assessment of potential 
expropriation as proxied by CG-Q, our second approach directly estimates the 
association between event-related abnormal returns and several ownership variables 
that proxy for the extent of expropriation of firm assets by the controlling shareholder. 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). 
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The ownership variables we use are the cash flow rights of the controlling 
shareholder, the dominance of the controlling shareholder, the presence of foreign 
shareholders and whether the State is the controlling shareholder. 
 
4.2.1 Corporate Governance-Q and Differences in Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
 We follow Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) in modelling a firm’s Tobin’s Q 
as a function of X i, a vector of corporate governance variables, and W i, a vector of 
firm characteristics:14
 
Q i = a + b X i + c W i + e i          (3) 
 
 
We define Q i as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt 
divided by the book value of total assets.15 Our vector W i includes firm size as 
measured by the log of total assets (Size i), firm leverage as measured by the ratio of 
total debt to total assets (Leverage i), growth opportunities as proxied by the actual 
growth in total assets from 1999 to 2002 (Growth Opportunities i)and a set of 25 
industrial-classification dummy variables (Industry Dummies). Total assets and total 
debt are measured by their year-end 1999 book values. 
 Our estimate of the corporate governance component of Q i (b X i in eq. (3) 
above) is the residual from the following regression: 
 
Q i  =  b 0  +  b1 Size i  +  b2 Leverage i  +  b3 Growth Opportunities i  
 
     +  bK Industry Dummies  +  e i ,      where K = 4 to 28    (4) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
13 Other studies that use Tobin’s Q to measure the discount in value resulting from agency problems are 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988); Barclay and Holderness (1989); and Servaes (1991). 
14 See equation (2), p. 126 and the associated discussion in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). 
15 Perfect and Wiles (1994) show that this measure is highly correlated with other definitions of 
Tobin’s Q. 
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The residual e i from eq. (4), which we refer to as CG-Q i, provides a firm-specific 
summary measure of corporate governance that is based on concurrent market prices. 
To test our hypothesis that firms with weak corporate governance outperform 
firms with good corporate governance around the four regulatory events, we estimate 
a cross-sectional model with the cumulative abnormal return of firm i as dependent 
variable and CG-Q i as independent variable. To estimate the cumulative abnormal 
return for each event for each firm, we estimate the market model over a 500 day 
period, where as before we include dummy variables for the 4 periods: 
 
Returni,t  =  β0   +  Σ β J, i,  Event J  +   β 5,i  Market Returnt +   ε i,t  (5) 
 
 
where:  
 Returni,t is the return for stock i on day t, 
βJ, i , J = 1 to 4, is the estimated cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of stock i 
during event window J;  
ε i,t is an i.i.d. random-error term for stock i on day t; and  
Market Returnt and Event J are defined as above. 
 
To control for heteroscedasticity, we follow Naranjo et al. (2000) and use 
weighted-least-squares regression to explain the abnormal returns, where the standard 
deviations of the prediction errors derived from the market model are used as weights. 
For each of the four events J, the cross-sectional model is as follows: 
 
β J, i  = γ 0   +  γ 1  CG-Q i  + ε i       (6) 
 
According to our hypothesis, we expect γ 1 to be negative; an inverse 
relationship between firm governance CG-Q i and the firm’s cumulative abnormal 
returns β J, i. 
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In addition to the cross-sectional regression, we use a portfolio time-series 
regression to test the relation between abnormal returns and the quality of corporate 
governance. The portfolio time-series regression is designed to deal with econometric 
problems that arise when there is cross-correlation in the firm return processes from 
which the CARs are estimated.  Cross-correlation is likely because, for each event, the 
event date and event windows are identical across sample firms. The portfolio time-
series regression provides unbiased estimates of the coefficients along with standard 
errors that fully account for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and cross-security 
dependence (see Sefcik and Thompson (1986)).16  
We implement the portfolio time-series approach by forming a portfolio that is 
long in high CG-Q firms and short in low CG-Q firms. We define low CG-Q firms as 
those in the lowest CG-Q quintile and high CG-Q firms as those in the highest CG-Q 
quintile. As robustness tests, we also show results for portfolios based upon the lower 
third (half) and upper third (half) of the CG-Q distribution. We hypothesize that the 
regulatory changes are more beneficial for firms with weak corporate governance 
(low CG-Qs) than for firms with strong corporate governance (high CG-Qs).  In other 
words, we expect our portfolio to have negative abnormal returns during the event 
periods. To control for market risk, we include the return on an equally weighted 
portfolio of firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges:  
 
R(CG-QHight ) – R(CG-QLowt ) = β0 + Σ β J  Event J + β 5  Market Returnt + ε t (7) 
 
 
where:  
                                                 
16 The problems of heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence can, in principle, also be 
addressed in a generalized-least-squares (GLS) regression. Several studies, however, show that GLS 
tests are highly sensitive to errors in specifying the abnormal return model. (See, for example, Chandra 
and Balachandran 1990.) Grammatikos and Saunders (1990) apply the Sefcik and Thompson 
methodology to study the effect of bank loan-loss reserve announcements on bank stock returns. Forbes 
(2002) uses the Sefcik and Thompson methodology to study the international transmission of financial 
crises at the firm level. 
 13
 R(CG-QHight) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the 
highest quintile (third or half) firms based upon CG-Q; 
R(CG-QLowt) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the 
lowest quintile (third or half) firms based upon CG-Q; 
β J, J = 1 to 4, give the estimated differences in the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) of the high-CG-Q and low-CG-Q portfolios during each event 
window J; and 
Market Returnt, Event J and ε t are defined as above.
The model is estimated over a period of 500 trading days that ends one day after the 
newspaper release of the draft of the independent director regulation.17
 
4.2.2 Ownership Structure and Differences in Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
Following La Porta et al (2002), we assume that the ultimate owner of the 
largest shareholder has effective control over a firm.18 We consider three variables 
that might mitigate the incentive of the controlling shareholder to expropriate 
minority shareholders.  
First, the incentive to expropriate outside investors is moderated by the cash-
flow ownership of the controlling shareholder (see La Porta et al. (2002) and 
Claessens et al. (2002)). The greater are the cash flow rights of the largest 
shareholder, the smaller is the difference in her cash-flow and control rights. Hence, 
we expect the beneficial effect of the regulation for minority shareholders to decrease 
with the cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder. Our empirical model includes 
the variable Largest Cash-Flow Rightsi, defined as the cash-flow rights of the ultimate 
                                                 
17 We obtain similar results if we use the portfolio of Hong-Kong listed Chinese firms (HKRett) as the 
market return. 
18 Note that the legal maximum for individual shareholdings in China and the absence of cumulative 
voting procedures reinforces the idea that the ultimate owner of the largest shareholder has effective 
control. 
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owner of the largest shareholder of firm i expressed as a percentage of all outstanding 
shares.  
Second, we define a variable that measures the control rights of the largest 
shareholder relative to those of the second and third largest shareholders. Largest 
Shareholder Dominance is the natural log of the ratio of the shareholding of the 
largest shareholder to the sum of the shareholdings of the second and third largest 
shareholders.19 Lins (2003) finds that large non-management block holders can act as 
a partial substitute for weak institutional governance mechanisms. We expect the 
ability of the largest shareholder to expropriate firm value decreases as the relative 
shareholdings of block holders with the ability and incentive to monitor the actions of 
the largest block holder increase (see, for example, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 
(2000)). We hypothesize that the benefits of the new regulations to protect minority 
shareholders are smaller for firms where the shareholdings of the second and third 
largest shareholders are large relative to the shareholding of the largest shareholder. 
Third, we include a dummy variable B-Share that is equal to one for firms that 
have A- and B-shares outstanding and equal to zero for all other firms. Some Chinese 
firms offer two classes of shares: Class-A shares, which can only be held by domestic 
investors, and Class-B shares, which can only be held by foreign investors.20 Most 
Class-B shareholders are international financial institutions, whereas most Class-A 
shareholders are individual investors, with only limited ownership by domestic 
financial institutions (see Mei, Scheinkman and Xiaong (2004)). In addition to the 
difference in investor sophistication, firms with only Class-A shares use Chinese 
accounting rules (PRC GAAP) to prepare their financial statements, whereas firms 
                                                 
19 Ownership in China is highly concentrated. For our sample, the three largest shareholders hold, on 
average, about 56 percent of total shares. The average shareholdings of the largest, second largest and 
third largest shareholders are 45 percent, 8 percent and 3 percent, respectively. 
20 On February 19, 2001, the CSRC announced that Chinese citizens are allowed to hold and trade 
Class-B shares. 
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with Class-A and Class-B shares report their results based on both PRC GAAP and 
International Accounting Standards (IAS). In general, IAS are regarded as providing 
superior transparency as compared to PRC GAAP (World Bank (2002)).  Given the 
differences in the level of sophistication of the shareholders and the level of 
transparency of the financial statements, we expect that controlling shareholders of 
firms with Class-B shares are less likely to expropriate minority shareholders.  
Another distinguishing characteristic of the ownership structure of Chinese 
listed firms is the predominance of State ownership.  We define State is Largest 
Shareholder as a dummy variable equal to one if a government agency or a State-
owned enterprise is the largest shareholder and equal to zero otherwise. While the 
results in Xu and Wang (1999) suggest that the State is more likely to expropriate 
firm assets than private block holders, the theoretical model of Perotti (1995) suggests 
that the State signals to the market that it is not tunneling by remaining the largest 
shareholder after privatisation. Agency theory also suggests that private block holders 
are more likely to tunnel the firm, as private block holders actually receive cash flows 
from the firm, whereas cash flows of State shares accrue to the taxpayer rather than to 
the government bureaucrats who exercise the State’s control rights.  In addition, the 
extensive expropriation by private block holders after privatisation in Russia and the 
Czech Republic suggests that the State is less likely to expropriate firm assets than 
private block holders (see, e.g., Black et al. (2000) and Coffee (1999)). Hence, we 
expect returns around the regulatory changes to be lower for State-controlled firms. 
To estimate the association between the cumulative abnormal returns and the 
ownership variables, we include firm size and leverage as controls. As before, we 
present cross-sectional regression results, and results based on the portfolio time-
series regression methodology.  
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The cross-sectional WLS regression model uses the standard deviations of the 
prediction errors derived from the market model as weights. The dependent variable is 
β J, i, the cumulative abnormal return of firm i during event window J estimated using 
eq. (5), and the independent variables are the ownership structure variables, with firm 
size and leverage as control variables: 
 
β J, i,  =  γ 0  +  γ J, 1  Largest Cash Flow Rightsi   
 
+ γ J, 2  Largest Shareholder Dominancei  + γ J, 3  B-sharesi + γ J, 4  State is Largesti  
 
+  γ J, 5  Firm Sizei + γ J, 6  Leveragei + γ  J, K Industry Dummy variables + ε J, i, 
 
where i = 1 to 850; J = 1 to 4;  K = 7 to 31          (8) 
 
The portfolio time-series regression involves three steps. First, we 
orthogonalize our six independent variables so that each is unrelated to the other 
independent variables and the industry dummies.21 Second, for each of the six 
orthogonalized variables, we construct a portfolio that is short the lowest quintile 
(third) of that variable and long the highest quintile (third). Third, we regress the 
returns for each of the six portfolios on the market return and event dummy variables, 
using the following model:  
 
R(OV-Hight)  – R(OV-Lowt) = β0 + Σ β J  Event J + β 5  Market Returnt + ε t  (9) 
 
 
where:  
R(OV-Hight) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the 
highest quintile (third)  firms based upon orthogonalized variable OV (largest 
cash shareholder flow rights, largest shareholder dominance, B-share, State, 
firm size or leverage); 
                                                 
21 Each of the six variables is replaced by the residual from a regression of that variable on an 
intercept, the other five independent variables and a set of industry dummies.
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R(OV-Lowt) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the 
lowest quintile (third) firms based upon orthogonalized variable OV (largest 
shareholder cash flow rights, largest shareholder dominance, B-share, State, 
firm size or leverage); 
β  J, J = 1 to 4, give the estimated differences in the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) of the high-OV and low-OV portfolio during each event 
window; and 
Market Returnt, Event J and ε t are defined as above.
As before, the model is estimated over a period of 500 trading days that ends June 5, 
2001. 
 
4.3  Data 
The data used in this study include information on accounting values, stock 
prices and ownership structure.  We obtain accounting data from the annual reports of 
924 companies listed on the Chinese Stock Exchanges as of year-end 1999. We 
obtained daily share-price information for each of our sample firms from Datastream. 
We obtained data on ultimate ownership and control patterns in close cooperation 
with Sinofin—one of the main providers of corporate financial information in China.  
From our initial sample of 924 firms, we delete 19 firms that are cross-listed 
on overseas exchanges (see footnote 8) and 25 firms for which we are unable to 
calculate the cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner. Finally, we define 25 separate 
industry sectors at the level of two-digit standard industrial classification, which we 
obtained from the CSRC. To obtain reliable estimates of industry-adjusted Q for our 
sample firms, we delete 30 firms from our sample where there are fewer than ten 
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firms in the industry. The three sets of deletions leave us with a final sample of 850 
firms.   
There are no dual-class shares in China so any difference between cash flow 
rights and control rights are due to pyramid structures and cross-holdings. To 
determine the ultimate owner of a listed company, we first identify the largest 
shareholder. We then find the largest shareholder of this largest shareholder, and so 
on, until we find the ultimate controller of the voting rights. In this process, we use 
the following rule: the ultimate controlling shareholder, A, has x percent control over 
listed firm XYZ if:   
i) A directly holds x percent of the shares in XYZ;  
ii) A is the largest shareholder in firm B, which holds x percent of the shares 
in XYZ; or  
iii) A is the largest shareholder in firm C, which is the largest shareholder in 
firm B, which holds x percent of the shares in XYZ (or any sequence of firms 
leading to firm B).  
If there are several chains of ownership between the controlling shareholder and the 
sample company, we add the other direct shareholdings to calculate the control rights 
of the ultimate owner. 
We also determine the control rights of the second and third largest 
shareholders, after establishing that the ultimate owner of these shareholdings is 
different from the ultimate owner of the largest direct shareholding. In case of State-
owned enterprises, the ultimate owner is either a bureau of State Asset Management, 
or a local government. In case of private firms the ultimate owner is a family or an 
individual. Appendix II gives a detailed example of the ownership structure of a State-
owned Enterprise and a private firm.  
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The cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner of the largest shareholding are 
determined by multiplying the proportional ownership along the ownership chain. For 
example, if firm A (the ultimate owner) owns 50 percent of firm B, which in turn 
owns 40 percent of listed firm C, then the cash flow rights of A are 20%, and the 
control rights of A are 40 percent. If firm A also owns 20 percent of firm D, which in 
turn owns 10 percent of firm C, A has 22 percent of the cash flow rights and 50 
percent of the control rights of C. 
Data on ultimate ownership of listed firms was only recently made public, and 
the first year for which we have data is 2002. Because our first event occurred in May 
2000, we include information from share-transfer agreements to trace back ownership 
changes between year-end 1999 and year-end 2002.22 Based on data from annual 
reports, we also compare the composition of direct shareholdings in 2002 with the 
composition of direct shareholdings in 1999 to establish any changes between 1999 
and 2002. Another problem is that, for some private firms, data in the chain of 
ownership is missing. In these cases, we assume 100 percent ownership (for example, 
if entity X controls firm B, which in turn owns 50% of listed firm C, and the exact 
ownership of X in B is unknown, then we assume X owns 100% of B). 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our analysis variables both for the 
entire sample and for quintiles based upon industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (actual Q less 
the appropriate industry-median Q). By comparing values across quintiles, we can get 
an idea about the univariate relationships between Q and our analysis variables. 
                                                 
22 Share transfer agreements are officially approved transfers of blocks of shares that are not publicly 
traded.  
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Table 1 shows a positive association between Q and return on equity, evidence 
of superior financial performance by higher Q firms. There is a negative association 
between Q and leverage and between Q and firm size, evidence that higher Q firms 
are smaller and use less leverage. The percentage growth in total assets in the period 
1999-2002 is positively related to industry-adjusted Q, supporting our use of ex-post 
growth in total assets as proxy for growth opportunities.  
There is no evidence of a relation between Q and the cash-flow rights of the 
controlling shareholder. We do see, however, that the largest shareholder’s dominance 
is lowest for the quintile with the highest Q.  For this last group, the percentage of 
firms controlled by a government agency or a solely-state-owned enterprise is also 
lower.23 Finally, we find that the proportion of firms with Class-B shares is relatively 
high for the low Q-firms. 
 
5.2 Market-Wide Impact of the Regulations 
As detailed in section 5.1, we use standard event-study methodology to obtain 
mean-adjusted and market-adjusted abnormal returns around the announcements of 
each regulatory change.  In Table 2, we present the results of this analysis.  For each 
of the four events, column two presents cumulative mean-adjusted returns and column 
three presents cumulative market-adjusted returns, where we use a portfolio of 
Chinese firms that trade on the Hong -Kong Stock Exchange in an attempt to control 
for market-wide movements unrelated to the regulatory events. 
In column two of Table 2, we see that the cumulative mean-adjusted return for 
the 11-day period around the announcement of the shareholder-meeting regulation is a 
positive 9.5 percent. This increase in the market’s market value is significant at better 
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than the five- percent level (p-value = 0.01). Around the announcements of the ban of 
related guarantees, the restriction on asset transfers and the regulation on independent 
directors, the cumulative mean-adjusted returns are positive 0.8 percent, positive 3.2 
percent and positive 2.6 percent, respectively, but none approach traditional levels of 
statistical significance. 24 We note that announcement of the shareholder-meeting 
regulation was the first in the series of new regulations and, as such, would be 
expected to have had the greatest element of “surprise.”  
 In column three of Table 2, we see that the cumulative market-adjusted returns 
are very similar to the cumulative mean-adjusted returns shown in column two.  Each 
of the four is positive and, in aggregate, they indicate that the four regulations led to 
an increase in market value of approximately 16 percent. As in column two, only the 
returns around the first event are statistically significant.  However, market-wide 
reactions to the individual events may obscure important differences in the reactions 
of firms with differing governance characteristics.  In the next section, we investigate 
whether there is evidence of cross-sectional differences in share price reaction. 
 
5.3 Corporate Governance-Q and Cross-Sectional Differences in CARs 
In Table 3, we present the results from estimating eq. (4). Consistent with 
earlier research (eg Lins 2003), we find that Tobin’s Q has a significantly negative 
relationship with firm size and leverage, and a significantly positive relationship with 
our proxy for growth opportunities. We use the residuals from regression model (4), 
as our firm-specific measure of expropriation, CG-Qi.  
                                                                                                                                            
23 The dummy variable State equals one if the largest shareholder is a Government Agency of a solely-
state owned enterprise. Our results do not change if State is redefined and also equals one if the largest 
shareholder is a state-controlled firm with private party participation. 
24 The use of a five-day event window (-2 through +2) around the release date and the date of the 
newspaper publication gives similar results for all our empirical tests. 
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In Panel A of Table 4, we report the results from estimating eq. (6), our cross-
sectional weighted least squares model of CARi on CG-Qi. For the announcements of 
the new shareholder-meeting rules, the ban of related guarantees, and the tighter rules 
on asset transfers, we see negative relationships between CG-Q and the cumulative 
abnormal return that are statistically significant at least at the ten-percent level.  For 
the related guarantees and asset transfer events, results are significant at better than 
the one-percent level. Returns around the fourth event, announcement of the 
independent-director requirement, are very small in size and significance.   
In Panel B of Table 4, we report the results from estimating eq. (7), our tests 
for difference in the CARs of the low- and high-CGQ groups for each of the four 
regulatory changes. As in Panel A, we see that each of the first three announcements 
are negative and significant at least at the ten-percent level, and that the related 
guarantees and asset transfer events are again significant at better than the one-percent 
level. Around the announcement of the new shareholder-meeting rules, the portfolio 
of firms in the highest-CGQ quintile underperformed the portfolio of firms in the 
lowest-CGQ firms by 2.4 percent. Around the announcement of the ban of related 
guarantees, this difference is 3.2 percent and, around the announcement of the tighter 
rules on asset transfers, the difference is 5.4 percent. Returns around announcement of 
the independent-director requirement are again very small in size and significance.  
As robustness tests, we repeat the analysis splitting the sample into three and two 
groups based upon CG-Q.  The statistics in panel B of Table 4 demonstrate that the 
results are almost identical to those obtained based upon five groups.  
To summarize the result in Table 4, it appears that the market found the first 
three regulations to be credible attempts at improving corporate governance of 
Chinese firms, but dismissed the regulation mandating independent directors. This 
finding is in contrast with Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), who find that appointments 
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of outside directors at U.S. firms are associated with small, but positive and 
significant excess returns.   In addition, the results show large and significant 
differences in the reactions of low- and high-CGQ firms, even though, as shown in 
Table 2, the market-wide reaction was not significantly different from zero for the 
related-guarantee and asset-transfer events.  Finally, it is instructive to note that 
returns around announcement of the regulation on asset transfers show the largest 
difference between the low- and high-CGQ portfolios. This finding is consistent with 
Johnson et al. (2000) and Bertrand et al. (2002), who show that non-arms length 
transactions among related firms are an important channel for “tunneling.”  
 
5.3.2 Ownership Structure and Cross-Sectional Differences in CARs 
In the previous section, we demonstrated significant cross-sectional 
differences in the share price reactions of firms with good and poor governance, 
where we use CG-Q as our proxy for the quality of corporate governance. In this 
section, we provide additional evidence on cross-sectional differences in the share -
price reactions of firms, using differences in the cash-flow rights of the largest 
shareholder, the dominance of the largest shareholder, the presence of B-shares and 
state ownership to proxy for the quality of corporate governance.25  
The results from estimating eq. (8), our cross-sectional regression model, and 
eq. (9), our portfolio time-series model, appear in Table 5. For each of the four events, 
we first present the WLS results from eq. (8), followed by the time-series results from 
eq. (9) based upon two portfolios: long on the high-quintile (third) and short on the 
low-quintile (third) of firms based upon each orthogonalized explanatory variable. We 
                                                 
25 When we regress CG-Q against these variables, we find that CG-Q is positively related to the cash 
flow ownership of the controlling shareholder and the B-share dummy, and negatively related to the 
dominance of the largest shareholder and the State dummy. All relations are significant at better than 
1% (results available from authors). 
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focus our discussion on the results from the portfolio-time series model because the 
standard errors from this model fully account for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity 
and interdependence returns of portfolios of firms, and because the results are 
qualitatively similar, for most part, across the three sets of results.  
First, we note that at least two of the explanatory variables are significant for 
each of the first three events, but none are significant for the independent-directors 
event.  This is consistent with the results reported in Table 4.  Clearly, the market 
found value in the first three regulations, but each of those regulations present clear 
rules that can easily be enforced in a rule-based civil law country like China by a 
powerful regulator such as the CSRC.  While the regulation requiring independent 
directors is clear, the ability of investors to hold independent directors accountable for 
the quality of their monitoring is much less clear.  Thus far, more than 90% of 
Chinese firms have adopted independent directors but their effectiveness is 
questionable.26
Second, we find that cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder are negatively 
related to the CARs for each of the first three events, but are only significant for the 
asset transfer announcement. However, when we combine the three “bright-line” 
regulations announced during the second quarter in 2000 and test whether the sum of 
the three coefficients is different from zero, we find that the negative relation between 
the CARs and the ownership of the largest shareholder is significant at the 1% level 
and that the sum of the differences in cumulative abnormal returns of the portfolios of 
the highest and lowest quintile firms is 4.3 %. This evidence suggests that 
expropriation from minority shareholders is lower for firms where the largest 
                                                 
26 A recent report by the Shenzen Stock Exchange argues that it is difficult for independent directors to 
exert effective power because of their lack of knowledge, and their dependence on the firm in terms of 
compensation and information.  Furthermore, it is difficult for investors to obtain information about the 
actions of independent directors, making them less accountable. 
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shareholder has greater ownership, and that these minority shareholders benefit less 
from the new regulation relative to those where the largest shareholder has less 
ownership. 
Third, we find a positive and significant relationship between CARs and our 
Large Shareholder Dominance variable for each event except the requirement of 
independent directors. Firms with relatively powerful controlling block holders, who 
can more easily expropriate wealth from minority shareholders, experienced 
significantly larger increases in value around the announcement of the new 
regulations than firms with less dominant controlling block holders.27 The total 
difference in the cumulative abnormal return around the first three events between the 
highest and lowest quintile portfolios is 4.9% and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. 
Fourth, the presence of foreign shareholders (Class-B shares) has a negative 
effect on the abnormal return for the first three announcements (not significant for the 
second announcement), and an insignificant positive effect on abnormal returns 
around the new regulation on independent directors. These results are consistent with 
our hypothesis that controlling shareholders of firms with foreign shareholders are 
less likely to expropriate minority shareholders because of the greater transparency 
and greater sophistication of these minority shareholders. The total difference in 
CARs around the first three events between the highest and lowest quintile portfolios 
is 5.4%, statistically significant at better than the one-percent level. 
                                                 
27 In an alternative specification, we use a trichotomous variable that also proxies for the monitoring of 
the largest shareholder by other large block holders. This variable equals 1 if the sum of the number of 
shares of the second and third block holders exceeds the number of shares held by the largest block 
holder. The variable equals –1 if no shareholder other than the largest block holder holds more than 0.5 
percent of the shares outstanding. For all other firms the variable equals 0. Consistent with the results 
in table 5, we find that this variable is negatively correlated with the CARs around the first 3 events at 
the 10% significance level or better, and not related to the independent director announcement (p-value 
is 0.95).  
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State ownership is only significantly negatively related to the CARs around 
the related-guarantee regulation. This result might reflect the fact that the issuance of 
related guarantees is more common at firms controlled by Legal Persons than at State-
controlled firms. An alternative explanation is that minority shareholders are less 
likely to be expropriated when the State is the largest shareholder. However, State 
ownership is not significantly related to the CARs around the other three regulatory 
events. 
Other results in Table 5 show that the CARs around the announcements are 
not related to leverage, as none of the coefficients are statistically significant. This 
result is consistent with the idea that creditors in China play a very limited role in the 
governance of firms. The four largest banks in China control the majority of banking 
assets in the country and are directly controlled by the Chinese government. These 
banks typically allocate credit to individual firms on the basis of national policy rather 
than on financial condition or performance, and typically are not involved in active 
monitoring.28  
The CARs around the asset transfer regulation are positively related to firm 
size, indicating that larger firms benefited relatively more from the restrictions on 
asset transfers that smaller firms.  For the other regulatory events, the results indicate 
no relationship between firm size and benefits from the new regulations. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
Our results indicate that, in aggregate, announcements of the regulatory 
changes designed to improve the protection of minority investors were associated 
with a 16 percent increase in the market value of firms listed on the Chinese Stock 
                                                 
28 In a recent study by the World Bank, the authors observe that “creditors are among the least effective 
instruments of corporate control in China” (World Bank (2002), p. xvi) 
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Exchanges.  The CAR around each announcement is positive, but only for the first 
announcement is this CAR statistically significant.  This leads to a couple of potential 
criticisms.  First, one could argue that our results are spurious, with our first event 
occurring just after a bottom in the Chinese market.  Hence, our sole significant event 
is simply a result of happenstance. If this were the case, however, then there is no 
reason to expect us to be able to explain cross-sectional variation in the firm-level 
CARs. Yet we do find cross-sectional variables that are significant at better than the 
.01 level and are supportive of our hypotheses. 
Second, one could argue that there are no statistically significant results for 
our last three events because we find positive but insignificant portfolio CARs.  If this 
argument is true, then we should find only noise in our cross-sectional analysis of 
these CARs.  Yet, we find cross-sectional variables for events 2 and 3 that, again, are 
significant at better than the .01 level and are supportive of our hypotheses. 
For three of the four individual announcements, we find statistically 
significant cross-sectional differences in abnormal returns of firms with high and low 
levels of expropriation (whether proxied by Corporate Governance-Q, or the 
ownership and relative power of the largest shareholder and the presence of foreign 
shareholders) that are supportive of our hypotheses. These results constitute new 
evidence that superior investor protection in the form of share-market regulation can 
create substantial value for minority shareholders, supporting the theoretical models 
of La Porta et al. (2002) and Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001).  
Given the lack of judicial enforcement in China, one might question how it is 
possible that we find such strong wealth effects.  Only for the announcement 
regarding the requirement of independent directors do we fail to find any significant 
differences in the returns of firms with high and low levels of expropriation.  We 
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attribute our results to a fundamental difference in the nature of independent-director 
regulation and the three earlier regulatory changes.   
Each of the first three regulations clearly set forth new protections of minority 
shareholders’ interests that are “self-enforcing,” e.g., that rely upon direct participants 
(shareholders, directors and regulators) rather than indirect participants (lawyers and 
judges).  The first regulation enabled minority shareholders to propose motions at 
Annual Meetings; increased their effective voting rights on associated trading; 
improved their ability to elect directors by requiring votes for each individual rather 
than for a slate; and enhanced their ability to take legal action when these and other 
rights are in dispute.  The second regulation clearly prohibited loan guarantees by the 
firm to the controlling shareholder, a bright line enabling shareholders, directors or 
the CSRC to easily demonstrate a violation.  The third regulation required much 
greater transparency regarding significant asset sales by the firm, including approval 
at the Annual Meeting, again enabling shareholders, directors or the CSRC to easily 
demonstrate a violation.  Even in cases where direct participants are required to seek 
relief in the Chinese Courts, there is virtually no need for judicial interpretation, the 
key weakness of a Civil-Law judiciary.   
In summary, each of the first three regulations can be viewed as simple 
“bright-line” rules that provide regulators, regulatees and the judiciary with clear 
boundaries as to what is required and what is legal. In large part, the regulations rely 
upon enforcement by direct participants in the corporation, e.g., shareholders, 
directors, and regulators, reducing the need for interpretation and official enforcement 
by indirect participants outside the corporation, e.g., lawyers and judges.  Black and 
Kraakman (1996) argue that, in transitional economies, enforcement by direct 
participants is preferable to enforcement by indirect participants because indirect 
enforcement often is unavailable or ineffective. Black and Kraakman also emphasize 
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that simplicity of legal rules is important in transitional countries where institutions 
such as the courts are underdeveloped. 
We argue that the fourth regulation (requiring independent directors) falls into 
the category of a “broad standard” rather than a “bright-line” rule.  While it is easy to 
evaluate compliance with the requirement that independent directors be appointed to 
the Board of Directors, it is a far more difficult task to evaluate whether or not the 
firm has provided these new directors with the information and support necessary for 
them to carry out their duty to protect the interests of minority shareholders.  
Moreover, the interpretation and enforcement of the regulations regarding the 
adequacy of support provided to independent directors relies heavily on parties 
outside the corporation, i.e., lawyers and judges.  Hence, this regulation fails the 
“bright-line” test, fails the simplicity test and fails the self-enforcement test. 
Accordingly, we expect that market participants in a civil-law country with a weak 
judiciary would view this regulation as of little value in protecting the interests of 
minority shareholders, and our results are consistent with this expectation. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Outside of the U.S. and Japan, relatively few firms are widely held; instead, 
firms with controlling shareholders predominate.  For such firms, the primary concern 
of corporate governance is the protection of minority shareholders from expropriation 
by a controlling shareholder and her management team.  
In this study, we examine whether securities-market regulation intended to 
improve investor protection in China, a civil-law transitional economy with poorly 
developed institutions, create or destroy shareholder wealth.  In aggregate, we find 
positive and significant increases in firm value of approximately 16 percent, primarily 
accruing to firms with weak governance. These results provide new evidence 
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supporting the theoretical model of La Porta et al. (2002), which predicts that better 
investor protection is rewarded with higher firm valuations. 
Our results also demonstrate that regulations to protect minority shareholders 
in a country with weak corporate governance can result in substantial increases in the 
value of minority shares, so long as there is an effective regulator and the new rules 
set clear boundaries. These results are consistent with the theory and evidence of 
Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001), who compare strategies for investor protection 
in Poland and the Czech Republic; they conclude that regulatory enforcement can 
effectively substitute for judicial enforcement in emerging markets with weak investor 
protection. In China, as in Poland, the securities-market regulator stepped up to fill the 
void in investor protection left by an ineffective and reactive judiciary. 
We find no evidence that Chinese shareholders found value in the introduction 
of independent directors, which we classify as a broad standard. We interpret this 
finding as evidence consistent with the disadvantage of broad standards relative to 
bright-line rules in a civil-law jurisdiction with poorly developed institutions, as 
postulated by Black and Kraakman (1996).  For each of the three bright-line 
regulations examined, which rely upon self-enforcement by direct market participants 
rather than by the judicial system, we find significant improvements in firm value for 
firms with weak governance.  
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Appendix 1: The Four Regulatory Announcements 
On May 18, 2000, the CRSC released a new regulation regarding the 
procedures for shareholder meetings, while emphasizing that all corporate directors 
have a fiduciary duty to conduct proper shareholder meetings. The new regulation 
was publicly announced on May 26, 2000.29 The most important improvements in 
terms of minority investor protection are: 
 
i) Shareholders who hold, separately or jointly, more than five percent 
of the voting power may propose motions for discussion at the 
shareholders’ Annual General Meeting. 
ii) When the meeting votes on associated trading, shareholders involved 
in the associated trading shall not participate in the voting, and their 
rights to vote shall not be counted among the aggregate shares 
possessing voting rights. 
iii) When a motion concerning the election of directors and members of 
the supervisory board is discussed at the shareholders’ meeting, 
shareholders shall vote on the candidate for director or supervisor 
individually. 
iv) When disputes occur concerning the assembling and convening of a 
meeting, voting procedures, or the legitimacy and effectiveness of a 
resolution, the parties concerned can take legal action in a People’s 
Court in order to resolve the dispute. 
 
On June 6, 2000, the CSRC released a new regulation prohibiting listed firms 
from issuing loan guarantees to their shareholders, shareholders’ subsidiaries, and 
individuals. In addition, if the firm should issue a loan guarantee to an unrelated party, 
it should obtain a mutual guarantee to control risk, and the firm’s managers are 
prohibited from signing a loan guarantee contract without approval of the board, or 
approval at a shareholders’ meeting. This regulation was first publicly reported in 
Chinese newspapers on June 15, 2000. 
 
On June 26, 2000, the CSRC released a new regulation regarding 
reorganizations of listed companies. The regulation, which was published in the 
newspapers on July 24, 2000, stipulates that if gross  (net) assets are acquired or sold 
that account for more than 50% of the latest audited gross (net) assets of the listed 
company, or the profit from acquired or sold assets account for more than 50% of the 
latest audited profit of the listed company, then the listed company shall perform the 
following procedures: 
 
i) The board of directors shall conduct a feasibility study and disclose the 
information as if it was a public offering. 
ii) The board shall hire accounting and law firms qualified to conduct 
securities business to certify the relevant issues. 
iii) The board shall issue a resolution on the relevant issues and report to 
the Stock Exchange within two days after the resolution is made, and 
announce to the public the resolution with the comments of the 
intermediaries and the board of supervisors. 
                                                 
29 Before publication in the newspapers, the regulatory changes were first released to a limited number 
of market participants: the securities regulatory offices, the stock exchanges and the listed companies. 
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iv) Upon examination and approval of the shareholders meeting, the listed 
company shall implement the plan of asset purchase or sale. 
v) If the counter-party has a tacit understanding with the controlling 
shareholder of the listed company, the transaction shall be deemed an 
affiliated transaction, which shall be subject to the relevant rules and 
regulations. 
vi) After the major purchase or sale of assets, the listed company shall 
ensure the separation of personnel, assets and accounting from its 
controlling shareholder.  
 
Finally, on May 30, 2001, both the chairman and the vice-chairman of the 
CSRC gave a speech in which they outlined a new independent director system 
requiring all listed firms to include independent directors on their board of directors. 
Detailed draft guidelines were released the next day on 31 May 2001, and published 
in the newspapers on June 4, 2001. The final regulation was released on August 16, 
2001. According to the CRSC press release, the regulation was explicitly intended to 
“improve the corporate governance structure and operation of listed companies.” and  
“[independent directors] shall be especially concerned with protecting the interests of 
minority shareholders from being infringed.”30  Specifically, the regulation requires 
the following: 
 
i) Listed company shall include independent directors on their boards of 
directors.  Independent directors are defined as those who hold no 
position with the company other than director, and who maintain no 
relationship with the company or its major shareholder that might 
impair his or her objective judgement. 
ii) Independent directors must possess the qualifications necessary for 
them to perform their duties.  In this respect, they must be familiar 
with the operation of listed companies and with the regulations and 
laws that apply to listed companies. 
iii) Independent directors must meet a set of “independence” requirements.  
These requirements disqualify (a) anyone holding a position with the 
listed company or its affiliates, along with their relatives; (b) anyone 
controlling more than one percent of the firm’s outstanding shares, 
either directly or indirectly, along with relatives of such persons; (c) 
anyone holding a position in a unit that directly or indirectly controls 
more then five percent of the listed company, along with the relatives 
of such persons; anyone who met conditions (a), (b), or (c) within the 
preceding year; anyone providing consulting, financial or legal 
services to the firm or its subsidiaries. 
iv) CSRC laws and regulations shall govern the nomination, election and 
replacement of independent directors. 
v) Independent directors must play an active role in the oversight of the 
firm.  To this end, the independent directors are given special powers, 
including initial approval of major related party transactions prior to 
submission to the full board; the power to propose that the board hire 
or fire an accounting firm; the power to propose to the board that an 
interim shareholders’ meeting be convened; the power to propose a 
                                                 
30 CSRC, Notice on Issuing the Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of 
Directors of Listed Companies, August 16, 2001. 
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meeting of the board; the power to appoint outside auditing and 
consulting organizations; the power to solicit proxies prior to the 
convening of a shareholders’ meeting.  To exercise any of these 
powers, a majority of independent directors must concur.  At least one 
half of certain board subcommittees, including audit, compensation, 
and nomination, should consist of outside directors. 
vi) Independent directors should make their positions known on major 
events affecting the governance of the firm.  Specific events mentioned 
include: nomination, appointment and removal of directors; 
appointment or removal of senior managers; compensation of directors 
and senior managers; loans from the firm and other fund transfers that 
exceed RMB3 million or 5% of the firm’s net assets; whether the firm 
has taken effective actions to collect outstanding past-due loans; and 
any events that the independent directors consider detrimental to the 
interests of the firm’s minority shareholders.  The independent 
directors are to provide one of four possible opinions: consent, 
reserved, dissent, or no-comment.  The independent director also shall 
provide the reasoning behind his or her opinion.  If the firm is required 
to disclose the matter, it must publish the opinions of the independent 
directors. 
 
The firm must provide the facilities necessary for the independent directors to 
carry out their duties.  The firm must provide the independent directors with timely 
information on important matters facing the firm, including sufficient documentation.  
The independent directors can request supplemental documents if they deem initial 
documentation insufficient.  When insufficient documentation is provided, 
independent directors may propose postponement of the meeting at which the matter 
is to be discussed.  Employees of the firm shall cooperate with independent directors 
and shall not hinder their work.  The firm shall bear any reasonable expenses incurred 
by the independent directors in performance of their duties.  The firm shall 
compensate independent directors appropriately.  Finally, the firm shall purchase 
liability insurance to protect independent directors from risks arising during 
performance of their duties. 
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Appendix II 
Examples of Ownership Chain 
 
Control and Ownership of Privately-owned Torch Investments Co. Ltd 
 
                                                         31.1% 
 
 
 
  
                      92%       8% 
 
 
 
      21.92%   
Delong International 
Strategic Investment 
Co., Ltd 
XinJiang Delong 
Group 
Tang Family 
(ultimate owner) 
 
 
 
                       
          
Torch Investment Co., Ltd (000549) 
Cash flow right of ultimate owner = 31.1%*92%*21.92%+21.92%*8%=8.025% 
Control right of ultimate owner = 21.92% 
 
Control and Ownership of State-owned Xiamen Overseas Chines Electronic Ltd. 
 
 
 
                                                   
 
 
                                                     100% 
Xiamen local 
government  
(ultimate owner) 
 
 
 
 
  93% 
Xiamen Jianfa Group 
Co., Ltd 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
 
                                                  58.26% 
        
Xiamen Overseas 
Chinese electronic 
enterprises Co 
 
 
                                                           
Xiamen Overseas 
Chinese Electronic 
Co., Ltd (600870) 
 
 
Cash flow right of ultimate owner =58.26%*93%*100%=54.18% 
Control right of ultimate owner =58.26% 
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Table 1 
Sample Descriptive Statistics by Tobin’s-Q Quintiles 
 
The sample consists of 850 publicly traded Chinese firms, segmented into five 
quintiles based upon industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q measured at the end of year 1999.  
Tobin’s Q is the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided 
by the book value of total assets. We control for differences in Q across industries by 
calculating the median Q for each industry and then by subtracting the appropriate 
industry median from each firm’s Q. Return on Equity is the firm’s net income 
divided by the book value of total equity at the end of year 1999. Leverage is the book 
value of debt divided by the book value of total assets at the end of year 1999. Total 
Assets is expressed in million RMB. Cash Flow Rights Largest is the cash flow rights 
of the ultimate owner of the shareholder with the largest direct shareholding as a 
percentage of all outstanding shares. Largest Shareholder Dominance is the natural 
log of the ratio of the shareholding of the largest shareholder to the sum of the 
shareholdings of the second and third largest shareholders. B-shares is a dummy 
variable equal to one if a firm has B-shares outstanding, and zero otherwise. State is 
the Largest Shareholder is a dummy variable equal to one if a government agency or 
a solely-state owned enterprise is the largest shareholder, and zero otherwise. For each 
variable in column 1, we calculate the mean and standard deviation across all firms in 
each quintile.  Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
 Quintile  
 
Variable 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Full 
Sample 
Industry-Adjusted  
Tobin’s Q 
 
-1.64
(0.57)
-0.64
(0.19)
0.01
(0.18)
0.97
(0.43)
5.51 
(5.81) 
0.84
(3.61)
Return on Equity 
 
 
-0.03
(0.49)
0.04
(0.32)
0.02
(0.49)
0.06
(0.23)
0.11 
(0.22) 
0.04
(0.37)
Leverage 
 
 
0.54
(0.19)
0.44
(0.19)
0.43
(0.18)
0.40
(0.18)
0.36 
(0.18) 
0.43
(0.19)
Total Assets 
 
286.0
(452.2)
201.3
(234.9)
141.8
(141.0)
97.9
(95.5)
71.0 
(54.3) 
159.5
(252.8)
Growth in  
Total Assets 
0.03
(0.51)
0.23
(0.58)
0.31 
(0.45) 
0.29
(0.47)
0.57 
(0.64) 
0.29
(0.57)
Cash Flow Rights  
of the  
Largest Shareholder 
0.43
(0.18)
0.45
(0.17)
0.46
(0.18) 
 
0.44
(0.19)
0.37 
(0.18) 
0.43
(0.18)
Largest Shareholder 
Dominance 
 
2.45
(1.68)
2.37
(1.68)
2.45
(1.68)
2.11
(1.84)
1.29 
(1.35) 
2.13
(1.71)
State is the Largest 
Shareholder 
 
0.54
(0.49)
0.50
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50)
0.56
(0.50)
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.48
(0.50)
B-shares  0.11
(0.31)
0.11
(0.31)
0.04
(0.19)
0.07
(0.27)
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.08
(0.26)
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 Table 2 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Regulatory Events 
 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around four events 
regarding new regulations intended to improve corporate governance at Chinese 
publicly listed firms, using an equally weighted portfolio consisting of all 850 sample 
firms. The results in column two and three are based on eq. (1) and eq. (2), 
respectively: 
 
Market Return t =  β0 + Σ β j  Event J + ε t      (1) 
 
Market Return t =  β0 + Σ β j  Event J + β5  HK Returnt + ε t   (2) 
   
where Market Return t is the return on an equally weighted market portfolio during 
day t; Event J, J = 1 to 4 are dummy variables that equal 1/n for the dates within the 
event window of length n for the first, second, third and fourth regulation and equal 
zero otherwise; HK Return t is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of 
24 Chinese firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange; and β j , J = 1 to 4 are the 
estimated cumulative mean/market-adjusted returns associated with each event 
window. The model is estimated over 500 trading days ending June 5, 2001 (one day 
after the newspapers published the draft regulation regarding Event 4). The event 
windows for event s1, 2, 3 and 4 are 11, 10, 23 and 6 trading days, respectively.  
p-values are in parentheses.  
a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) 
Intercept  
 
0.000
(0.09)
-0.000 
(0.97) 
 
Event 1: 
Shareholder Meeting 
 
0.095 a
(0.01)
0.109 a
(0.01) 
Event 2: 
Related Guarantees 
 
0.008
(0.83)
 0.001 
(0.98) 
Event 3: 
Asset Transfer 
 
0.032
(0.57)
0.024 
(0.68) 
Event 4:  
Independent Directors 
   
0.026
(0.37)
0.021 
(0.48) 
Hong-Kong  
Return 
 
 0.075 a
(0.01) 
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Table 3 
Cross sectional Regression model Tobin’s Q 
 
This table reports the results from estimating eq. (4), where we regress Tobin’s Q on 
firm size, leverage and growth opportunities along with a set of 25 industry dummy 
variables: 
 
Q i  =  b0  +  b1 Firm Size i  +  b2 Leverage i  +  b3 Growth Opportunities i  
                +  b K Industry Dummies  +  ei ,  K = 4, . . . , 28    (4) 
 
For each firm, size is measured by the log of total assets, leverage is measured by the 
ratio of total debt to total assets, and growth opportunities are proxied by the actual 
growth in total assets from 1999 to 2002. Total assets and total debt are year-end 1999 
book values. The residual e i from eq. (4), which we refer to as CG-Q i, provides a 
firm-specific summary measure of corporate governance that is based on concurrent 
market prices. There are 850 observations.  
t-statistics appear below each coefficient in parentheses.   
a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
 
       
Variable Coefficient
(t-statistic)
 
Intercept  
 
23.197 a
(13.15) 
 
Firm Size 
 
 
-1.583 a
(-10.76)
Leverage -1.899 a
(-2.86) 
Growth  
Opportunities 
0.951 a
(4.40) 
Industry Dummies Yes
 
Adjusted R2 0.24
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Table 4 
Corporate-Governance Q and Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
 
This table reports the relation between our firm-specific summary measure of 
corporate governance (CG-Q) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Estimation 
of CG-Q is described in Table 3. Panel A reports the results from the weighted-least-
squares cross-sectional regression model:  
β J, i  = γ 0   +  γ 1  CG-Q i  + ε i       (6) 
where β J, i is the CAR for event J estimated for each firm using the market model:  
Returni,t  =  β0   +  Σ β J, i,  Event J  +   β 5,i  Market Returnt +   ε i,t  (5) 
where:  Returni,t is the return for stock i on day t, βJ, i , J = 1 to 4, is the estimated 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of stock i during event window J; ε i,t is an i.i.d. 
random-error term for stock i on day t; and Market Returnt and Event J are defined in 
Table 2. This model is estimated over 500 trading days ending June 5, 2001 (one day 
after the newspapers published the draft regulation regarding Event 4).  
 
Panel A: Weighted-Least-Squares Regression of CARi on CG-Qi
 Shareholder 
Meeting 
Related 
Guarantees 
Asset 
Transfer 
Independent 
Directors 
Intercept 
 
0.001
(0.30)
0.002
(0.34)
0.004
(0.26)
0.002 
(0.21) 
  CG-Q 
 
-0.002 c
(0.09)
-0.004 a
(0.01)
-0.005 a 
(0.01)
0.000 
(0.99) 
 
Panel B reports the results from the portfolio time-series regression model:  
R (CG-QHight ) – R (CG-QLowt ) = β0 + Σ β J  Event J + β 5  Market Returnt + ε t (7) 
where:  R (CG-QHight) is the return for day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the 
highest quintile/third/half of firms based upon CG-Q; R (CG-QLowt) is the return for  
day t on an equally weighted portfolio of the lowest quintile/third/half of firms based 
upon CG-Q; β J, J = 1 to 4, give the estimated differences in the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) of the high-CG-Q and low-CG-Q portfolios during each event  
window J; and Market Returnt, Event J and ε t are defined as above.
Each cell in Panel B presents the estimated difference in the CARs of the low- and 
high-CG-Q groups around each of the four regulatory changes. CG-Q is a firm-
specific measure of corporate governance, defined as the difference between each 
firm’s actual and predicted Q, where the predicted value is based on a set of variables 
commonly used in the literature to explain Q (industry, firm size, leverage and growth 
opportunities) as shown in Table 3. The p-values in Panel A are based on 
heteroscedasticity-consistent White standard errors.   a, b, and c indicate statistical 
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Portfolio Time-Series Regressions  
(Return(High CG-Q) –  Return(Low CG-Q)) 
 Shareholder 
Meeting 
Related 
Guarantees 
Asset 
Transfer 
Independent 
Directors 
5 Groups -0.024 c
(0.07)
-0.032 a
(0.01)  
-0.054 a
(0.01)
-0.001 
(0.92) 
3 Groups -0.018 c
(0.07)
-0.025 a
(0.01) 
-0.049 a
(0.01)
0.001 
(0.91) 
2 Groups  
 
-0.015 b 
(0.04)
-0.022 a
(0.01) 
-0.049 a
(0.01)
0.001 
(0.85) 
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Table 5 
Ownership Structure and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This table reports the results from estimating eq. (8) and eq. (9). In eq. (8), we use a weighted-least-squares regression model to regress ownership-
structure variables on cumulative abnormal returns of individual stocks around each of four regulatory announcements (CAR J, i), using the standard 
deviation of the prediction errors derived from the market model as weights:   
CAR J, i  =  γ 0  + γ J, 1   CF Rights Largest Shareholderi  +  γ J, 2  Large Shareholder Dominancei  +  γ J, 3   B-sharesi   
                             +  γ J, 4   State is Largesti  +  γ J, 5  Leveragei  +  γ J, 6  Firm Sizei + γ J, K Industry Dummies  +  ε J, i ,   K = 7, . . . , 31  (8) 
In eq. (9), we use a portfolio time-series regression model to regress a set of four event-window dummies on the returns from a portfolio that is long on 
the highest and short on the lowest third or quintile of firms based upon orthogonalized explanatory variable OV, where OV is either Cash-flow rights of 
the largest shareholder, Largest shareholder dominance, State is the largest shareholder, B-shares, Leverage or Firm size:  
Return(OVHight)   – Return(OVLowt)   =   β0  +  Σ β J   Event j +  β 5  Market Returnt  +  ε t        (9) 
Each cell under the heading Third and Quintile gives β J, J = 1 to 4, the difference in the CARs of the high-OV and low-OV groups during the event 
window around each announcement of a regulatory change. The models are estimated over 500 trading days ending June 5, 2001.  
p-values appear in parentheses. The p-values in the WLS-regression are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent White standard errors  
a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
  Shareholder Meeting Related Guarantees Asset Transfers Independent Directors 
 
 WLS               Portfolio WLS                    Portfolio WLS                   Portfolio 
 
WLS            Portfolio 
 Third      Quintile  Third      Quintile Third      Quintile Third    Quintile  
Cash-flow rights 
of the largest 
Shareholder 
-0.039b
(0.04)  
-0.004 
(0.55) 
-0.012
(0.14)
-0.015
(0.42)
-0.005
(0.44)
-0.005
(0.48)
-0.047c
(0.08) 
-0.021b
(0.02) 
-0.026b
(0.02) 
0.010
(0.35)
0.003
(0.52)
0.005 
(0.36) 
Largest 
shareholder 
Dominance 
0.005a
(0.01)  
0.018a
(0.01) 
0.019a
(0.01)
0.004c
(0.07)
0.012b
(0.04) 
0.012c
(0.07)
0.007a
(0.01) 
0.030a
(0.01) 
0.019c
(0.07) 
-0.002
(0.83)
0.004
(0.42)
-0.002 
(0.64) 
State is  
the largest 
shareholder 
-0.001 
(0.77) 
-0.004 
(0.46) 
-0.006
(0.49)
-0.007
(0.14)
-0.013a
(0.01) 
-0.020a
(0.01)
0.007
(0.27)
0.003
(0.76)
0.005
(0.65)
-0.001
(0.81)
0.001
(0.91)
-0.002 
(0.69) 
B-shares 
 
 
-0.034a
(0.01)  
-0.017a
(0.01) 
-0.018b
(0.04) 
-0.019b
(0.02) 
-0.007
(0.22)
-0.01
(0.20)
-0.017
(0.19)
 -0.026a
(0.01) 
-0.025b
(0.05) 
0.016b
(0.02)
0.001
(0.78)
0.005 
(0.40) 
Leverage 
 
 
-0.013 
(0.35) 
0.005 
(0.65) 
0.003
(0.84)
-0.012
(0.37)
0.001
(0.89)
0.002
(0.87)
-0.009
(0.64)
0.012
(0.40)
-0.001
(0.95)
0.007
(0.32)
0.002
(0.76)
0.003 
(0.73) 
Firm Size 
 
 
0.009a
(0.01) 
0.014 
(0.22) 
0.015
(0.29)
0.011a
(0.01) 
0.008
(0.47)
0.016
(0.23)
0.027a
(0.01)
0.036b
(0.03)
0.043b
(0.03) 
-0.002
(0.19)
-0.004
(0.62)
-0.007 
(0.52) 
 
